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The SEC rules historical cost accounting: 
1934 to the 1970s 
Stephen A. ZefP 
Abstract-From its founding in 1934 until 1972 the SEC, and especially its chief accountant,disapproved of most 
upward revaluations and general price-level restatements of fixed assets as well as depreciation charges based 
thereon. This article is a historical study of the evolution of the SEC’s policy on upward revaluations and restate- 
ments of non-financial assets. It treats episodes prior to 1972 when the private-sector bodies that established ac- 
counting principles sought to gain a degree of acceptance for such revaluations and restatements but were 
consistently rebuffed by the SEC. The SEC reversed its policy on upward revaluations during the period from 1972 
to the end of the 1970s. Throughout the article, the author endeavours to explain the factors that influenced the suc- 
cessive positions taken by the SEC. 
It is well known that the United States has long 
been a bastion of predominantly historical cost ac- 
counting for inventories and fixed assets. Not so 
well known, however, is the fact that the US insis- 
tence on the use of historical cost accounting has 
emanated from the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and has not always been a 
tenet held and advocated by leaders of the ac- 
countancy profession. It is the aim of this paper to 
trace the SEC’s powerful influence over the pre- 
dominance of historical cost accounting in the US 
from its founding in 1934 until the 1970s. 
1. Early evolution of the SEC’s position on 
historical cost 
The SEC came into existence on 2 July 1934 and 
was charged with administering the Securities Act 
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
the second of which established the SEC.’ This 
legislation empowered the SEC to set the rules and 
regulations to govern the reporting, accounting 
and disclosure of financial information by compa- 
nies whose securities were quoted on any national 
securities exchange, including the contents of 
prospectuses and periodic filings with the 
Commission. The SEC created the position of 
chief accountant in the autumn of 1935, and after 
*The author is the Herbert S .  Autrey Professor of 
Accounting, Rice University, Houston, Texas, USA. 
Correspondence address: Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of 
Management, Rice University - MS 531, PO Box 2932, 
Houston, TX 77252-2932, USA. E-mail: sazeff@rice.edu. 
This paper is an outgrowth of the author’s presentation at the 
Information for Better Markets conference, sponsored by the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales and 
held in London on December 18-19, 2006. The author is 
grateful to Kees Camfferman, Todd Johnson, seminar partici- 
pants at Cardiff Business School, and an anonymous reviewer 
for useful comments on earlier drafts. 
a short search it named Carman G. Blough, a 
certified public accountant and former academic 
and Wisconsin government employee who had 
joined the Commission’s registration division in 
1934, to the position on 1 December 1935 (Chatov, 
1975: 103; Cooper, 1980:22). He remained as chief 
accountant until May 1938, when he left the 
Commission. From 1944 to 1961, he served as the 
full-time director of research of the American 
Institute of Accountants (AIA, Institute).2 
The person who effectively cemented the SEC’s 
policy to insist upon historical accounting was 
Robert E. Healy (pronounced Haley). Prior to 
becoming one of the five founding SEC 
commissioners in 1934, Healy had been Chief 
Counsel of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
from 1928 to 1934 and directed the FTC’s six- 
year, Congressionally mandated investigation into 
the market manipulations by public utility holding 
companies, with heavy emphasis on their use of 
dubious accounting practices during the 1920s. In 
the end, the record of the investigation accumulat- 
ed to 95 volumes. 
Healy had been a justice on the Vermont 
Supreme Court, and President Calvin Coolidge, a 
Vermonter himself, selected his fellow Republican 
to direct the FTC’s mammoth investigation. Joel 
Seligman, the SEC’s historian, has written, ‘The 
experience radicalised the conservative Healy. 
Shocked to find that ‘you can capitalise in some 
States practically everything except the furnace 
ashes in the basement’, he became an uncompro- 
’ The Federal Trade Commission administered the 
Securities Act of 1933 from June 1933 until 1 September 1934, 
when this authority was transferred to the SEC. 
For a discussion of the role of the Chief Accountant in re- 









































50 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
SEC accountants, the seniors of whom had 
served during his incumbency, until the retire- 
ment of Andrew Barr as Chief Accountant in 
1972. It would be unfair to attribute the SEC’s 
position solely to Healy, since the position con- 
tinued for over a quarter of a century after his 
death. His position became that of other com- 
missioners and a long succession of staff mem- 
bers because it suited their needs to emphasise 
objectivity at the expense of other potential at- 
tributes of an accounting system.’ (1979: 182) 
Healy served on the SEC from 1934 until his 
death in November 1946. His record of service as 
a commissioner was the longest in the SEC’s his- 
tory. Blough’s immediate three successors as chief 
accountant - William W. Werntz ( I  938-47), Earle 
C. King (1947-56), and Andrew Barr (1956-72) - 
all had joined the Commission’s accounting 
staff in the 1930s. Healy and like-minded 
commissioners succeeded in instilling in them an 
aversion to upward departures from historical cost 
if they had not already held that view. In fact, Barr 
had studied under A. C. Littleton, at the University 
of Illinois, who was the intellectual leader of the 
historical cost school. 
In a comprehensive study of write-ups, R.G. 
Walker found that, in the SEC’s first several years, 
its staff discouraged write-ups, and the 
Commission rejected asset appraisals that were de- 
void of adequate supporting evidence, not so much 
because of the revaluation practice per se 
(1992:10-15)> In some cases, notably Norfhern 
States Power Company, a divided Commission 
(with Healy in the minority) allowed appraisals if 
there was sufficient disclosure of the procedure 
used (Healy, 1938:2-3). Around 1937/38, howev- 
er, the SEC and its accounting staff began to take 
a more unequivocal stance against write-ups and 
by the 1940s were actively banning them. Walker 
wrote, ‘It appears that the SEC had virtually elim- 
inated write-ups from the accounting practices of 
its registrants by the mid-1940s’ (1992:22). By 
1970, Kripke would write, ‘In effect the SEC has 
made it an exercise in futility for practicing ac- 
countants or anyone else to argue for revision of 
valuation methods in balance sheets or income 
statements’ (1970:1189). 
In 1936, the SEC received some academic sup- 
port for its historical cost position when the 
American Accounting Association’s executive 
committee, led by Association President Eric L. 
Kohler, published ‘A tentative statement of ac- 
counting principles affecting corporate reports’, 
which strongly endorsed ‘original cost’ for physi- 
cal assets. The committee said, ‘If values other 
than unamortised [historical] costs are to be quot- 
ed they should be expressed in financial statements 
only as collateral notations for informative purpos- 
es’ (1936: 189). The committee was explicitly crit- 
mising advocate of accounting and public utility 
reform’ (2003: 108). 
Healy was livid at the asset value write-ups that 
public utilities had been booking. It was not only 
the write-ups themselves, ‘however arrived at’ (as 
he said), that incensed him as much as the utilities’ 
follow-on accounting practices. He complained of 
‘write-ups used to create income or to relieve the 
income accounts of important charges’ (1 938: 1), 
which would be debited to the capital surplus ac- 
count that had been credited with the write-ups. 
Dividends would sometimes be paid against this 
unrealised appreciation, and ‘Very often unamor- 
tised debt discount was charged against a capital 
surplus so created, thus increasing the reported 
earnings of the company in future years’ (Healy, 
1939:4). He was driven to the conclusion that all 
upward departures from historical cost were veri- 
tably heinous. In testimony to a Congressional 
committee in April 1934, he said, ‘I think the prop- 
er function of accounting is to make a historical 
record of events as they happen’ (Stock Exchange 
Practices, 1934:7606)? Later in the 1930s he 
wrote, ‘I think the purpose of accounting is to ac- 
count - not to present opinions of value’ (1938:6). 
Remarking on Healy’s influence within the SEC, 
Carman Blough wrote as follows, 30 years later: 
‘One of the first members of the newly formed 
SEC to be appointed was a former General 
Counsel for the Federal Trade Commission who 
had been in charge of that Commission’s very 
comprehensive investigation of the public utility 
holding companies. During that study the fla- 
grant write-up policies of the holding companies 
and their subsidiaries and the havoc they caused 
when the crash came in 1929 and 1930 kept im- 
pressing themselves on the chief investigator to 
the point that their evil became almost an obses- 
sion with him.. . .So strong were his convictions 
and so convincing were his arguments against 
write-ups that all of the other members of the 
Commission were persuaded to take a positive 
stand against them from the very first case in 
which the question arose.’ (1967: 10). 
Homer Kripke, a distinguished legal scholar 
who was an SEC attorney in 193944, has written, 
‘Healy’s strong views dominated the 
Commission in the 1930s and 1940s when it was 
still struggling to undo the effects of the indis- 
criminate departures from [historical] cost in the 
1920s. They influenced a whole generation of 
This passage was quoted, slightly amiss, in de Bedts 
(1964:93). ‘ Reflecting mainly on the Commission’s early years, Barr 
and Koch (1959:181-2) have written, ‘A review of the infor- 
mal cases involving appraisals shows that the Commission 
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ical of revaluations and the use of adjustments for 
‘ordinary’ changes in price levels. It is likely that 
the Association’s executive committee was also re- 
coiling from the indiscriminate asset write-ups in 
the 1920s. 
Not surprisingly, SEC chief accountant Blough 
said in 1937 that he agreed with the Association’s 
tentative statement (1937:30). Four years later, the 
Association published an important monograph 
written by two members of its 1936 executive 
committee, William A. Paton and A. C. Littleton, 
which contained an elegant conceptual rationale 
for the use of historical cost accounting. Yet in 
their final chapter, entitled ‘Interpretation’, the au- 
thors (chiefly Paton) objectively discussed the 
pros and cons of replacement cost accounting and 
‘common dollar’ accounting. As to the latter, they 
said, ‘At the most what is needed is a special report 
supplementing the usual periodic statements and 
designed to trace the main effects of general price 
movements upon the affairs of the enterprise’ 
(1940:141), which was a heady proposal at that 
time. Of the two authors of the monograph, 
Littleton, at the University of Illinois, was, 
throughout his career, an arch historical coster. 
Paton, at the University of Michigan, was a ‘value’ 
man.5 The historical cost portion of this mono- 
graph became a standard text used in university ac- 
counting curricula and was widely read by 
practitioners as well. 
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2. Developments in the 1940s and 1950s: 
the SEC’s position hardens 
2.1. Write-ups 
In the context of the SEC’s stiffening position on 
asset write-ups, the US body that established ac- 
counting principles (as standard setting was then 
known), the AIA’s part-time Committee on 
Accounting Procedure, which was composed of 18 
practitioners in accountancy firms and three aca- 
demics, began addressing the question itself. In its 
Accounting Research Bulletin (ARB) No .  5 ,  
‘Depreciation on appreciation’, issued in April 
1940, the committee said, in less than categorical 
terms, ‘Appreciation [on fixed assets] normally 
should not be reflected on the books of account of 
corporations’ (461). It added, however, that, where 
such appreciation has been recorded, ‘income 
should be charged with depreciation computed 
on the new and higher figures’ (461). The editor 
of The Journal ofAccountancy said that the topic 
of the Bulletin ‘has proved to be a particularly 
thorny subject’ (‘Two new Research Bulletins’, 
Letter from Paton to the author, dated 24 February 1979. 
An ‘upward’ quasi-reorganisation might be labelled today 
as an ‘enhancement gain’ as the opposite number of an im- 
pairment loss. 
1940:427). In fact, there were four dissenters. 
Noteworthy among them was William Paton, who 
wrote that depreciation on appreciation should not 
be a determinant of net income ‘except in cases 
where the appraisal is a feature of formal or quasi- 
reorganization’ (467). The Bulletin contained only 
an inconclusive discussion of the pros and cons of 
allowing asset write-ups by means of a quasi-reor- 
ganisation. 
The term ‘quasi-reorganisation’ refers to an ac- 
counting procedure by which a company in severe 
financial straits, with a deficit in retained earnings, 
could avoid the expensive process of a legal reor- 
ganisation by eliminating the deficit and writing 
down its net asset values to levels that are justified 
in the light of its economic prospects, as if the 
company were engaging in a fresh start. Thereby, 
the company would have the prospect of declaring 
dividends in future years. Today, we would use the 
term ‘impairment loss’ as the rough equivalent of 
the write-down in the net assets, although the pro- 
cedure to be used in a quasi-reorganisation is much 
more elaborate and may require approval by the 
shareholders (see SEC, 1941; Davis and Largay, 
1995) 
By the middle of the 1940s, the committee began 
looking for ways to gain acceptance for upward 
departures from historical cost. In 1945, the com- 
mittee unanimously resolved to elaborate on ARB 
No. 5. The committee’s proposal, made in the form 
of a resolution in October 1945, was intended to 
open the door to the acceptability of an ‘upward’ 
quasi-reorganisation when ‘supported by convinc- 
ing evidence and [when] effected with due formal- 
ity’ (‘Annual Report’, 1946: 104): The argument 
was made that, since a company could liquidate it- 
self and come into existence afresh by recognising 
contemporary current costs, whether higher 
or lower, in its balance sheet, why should it not 
be possible to establish a new basis of 
accountability without actually liquidating and re- 
launching the company? This may have been a tac- 
tic to ‘blind-side’ the SEC, which had accepted a 
‘downward’ quasi-reorganisation. The committee 
intended to draft an Accounting Research Bulletin 
to reflect this unanimous view. Yet, the following 
year, the committee reported that it had decided to 
postpone the preparation of a formal Bulletin 
(‘Annual Report’, 1947: 109). The reason was that 
SEC chief accountant William Werntz had pub- 
licly made known his antipathy to using the quasi- 
reorganisation to record a write-up of assets 
(1945:386-7). Instead, the committee was content 
to write a letter to the AIA’s executive committee 
dated 20 October 1945, saying 
‘...a new cost may and should be recognised 
whenever a new basis of corporate accountabili- 
ty is established by reorganisation or quasi-reor- 








































52 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
books has ceased to be representative of their ed from pursuing negotiations over wages during 
value.” (the letter was reproduced in Research the war, to press for significant wage increases 
Department, 1950:390) and pension benefits. Also, major companies 
sought a way of defending themselves against Five years later, in 1950, the committee returned public criticisms that they were profiteering at the to the question, following the high post-war infla- public’s expense (see Smith, 1955: 172, 363-5, tion. It decided, again unanimously, to draft a Appendix B; Depreciation Policy When Price Bulletin to recommend quasi-reorganisation ac- Levels Change, 1948). Finally, industry hoped counting that would allow write-ups. But the SEC that the use of replacement cost depreciation in scotched the initiative yet again by advising the their financial statements might persuade committee that it would not accept financial state- Congress to give them comparable relief from ments with write-ups of the kind envisaged in the being taxed on capital. But SEC chief accountant proposed Bulletin. Hence, the Bulletin was never Earle King, as could be predicted, immediately issued (see Zeff, 1972: 156-7). 
objected to these upward departures from histori- When SEC chief accountants criticised upward 
cal cost (1947a:22), which prompted US Steel departures from historical cost, it was customary 
instead to adopt accelerated historical cost that they raised the spectre of the indiscriminate 
write-up practices of the 1920s, as if it were a depreciation on its postwar expenditures for prop- 
produced financial results that were not all that It was apparently of no moment to the SEC’s 
chief accountant that an Gupward7 quasi-reorgani- different from the use of replacement cost depre- 
tual leaders of the profession. The doyen of the King was content with this tactical shift adopted 
accountancy profession, George 0. May, a retired by us (1950:43). Congress, like the SEC, 
partner of price, Waterhouse & c0 .  and a member preferred the objectivity of historical cost, and in 
given support to such a procedure in a major book new methods of accelerated depreciation on his- 
(1943:99). William Paton, who was a member of torical cost into the income tax law. 
the committee from 1939 to 1950, had been writ- Because of the suddenness of the decision of 
ing since 1940 that there was an urgent need to these major companies in l947 to adopt replace- 
allow an ‘upward’ quasi-reorganisation in order to ment cost depreciation in the determination of 
correct for historical costs that were out of line earnings, the committee had to act quickly to ex- 
with current economic realities (see Zeff, press its view as soon as possible. After the rebuff 
1979:115, 122-6). administered by the SEC two years earlier to the 
Between these two ill-fated attempts to issue a Committee’s attempt to sanction Write-ups under 
Bulletin in favour of ‘upward’ quasi-reorganisa- the head of quasi-reorganisations, it is likely that 
tions, which were crushed by explicit opposition some Committee members who favoured the use 
from the SEC, the committee faced the question of replacement cost depreciation would have 
of accounting for the effects of the high postwar voted against it because of expected opposition of 
inflation on depreciation. In 1947, several major the SEC. Therefore, it is difficult to know whether 
companies, including United States Steel, all of the committee members were voting their 
DuPont, Allied Chemical & Dye, and Sears genuinely held views. The committee reacted 
Roebuck, opted to record depreciation at replace- quickly by Publishing a statement in the October 
ment cost in their financial statements. Industry 1947 issue of The Journal Of Accountancy 
was concerned that companies with a sizable de- (Committee on Accounting Procedure, 1947). The 
preciation charge were significantly overstating committee re-issued this statement as Accounting 
their reported earnings. Such earnings reports, Research Bulletin N O .  33, entitled ‘Depreciation 
companies believed, would be a stimulus for en- and high costs’, dated December 1947. The 
couraging labour unions, which had been prevent- committee’s decision, which was taken with one 
qualified assent and one abstention! was that any 
depreciation in excess of normal historical cost 
depreciation for the year should be recorded 
‘below the line’, meaning as an appropriation of 
net income Or sup1us and not as a deduction in ar- 
riving at net income. It said that ‘consideration of 
nightmare that should not be experienced again. erty, plant and equipment, which, as it happens, 
sation had won the support of two of the intellec- ciation (see McMullen, 1949; Blough, 1947). 
and a former vice-chairman of the committee, had 1954 it struck a compromise by introducing two 
’ It is not clear what authority such a letter would possess, 
although it may be assumed that the SEC’s accounting staff 
knew of it. In effect, by sending the letter instead of issuing an 
Accounrina Research Bulletin. the Committee was registering 
its view without ‘officially’ proposing a practice to” be f o r  
lowed. 
The abstaining party was William Paton, who wrote to the 
author on 6 December 1971 that he left the Committee’s meet- 
ing room in despair during the discussion prior to taking the 
vote. 
radical changes in accepted accounting procedure 
should not be undertaken, at least until a stable 
price level would make it practicable for business 
as a to make the change at the Same time’. 








































Special Issue: International Accounting Policy Forum. 2007 
be achieved, the opponents of an upward depar- 
ture from historical cost depreciation could dis- 
miss the issue as no longer urgent. SEC chief 
accountant King, who had attended the 
committee’s meeting, publicly lauded the 
committee’s statement (1947b: 127-8)? 
In October 1948, the committee, stung by criti- 
cisms made of ARB No. 33 at the Institute’s annu- 
al meeting the previous month,’O reaffirmed its 
position on replacement cost depreciation in a let- 
ter to Institute members (Committee on 
Accounting Procedure, 1948). But by then the vote 
attracted four dissenters - the chairman who was 
the senior technical partner at Peat Marwick 
(Samuel J. Broad), two well-known partners from 
middle-sized firms (Maurice E. Peloubet and C. 
Oliver Wellington, a former chairman of the 
committee), and an accounting professor (Paton). 
These four disagreed with the committee’s view 
that ‘no basic change in the accounting treatment 
of depreciation of plant and equipment is practica- 
ble or desirable under present [inflationary] condi- 
tions’ (1948:381). This was the first time in the 
committee’s history that its chairman had regis- 
tered a dissent. But, as always, the SEC won the 
day. In the same issue of The Journal of 
Accountancy in which the committee’s letter was 
reproduced, the editor defended the committee’s 
position at length in an editorial (‘Institute 
Committee’, 1948). 
During the 1940s, the American Accounting 
Association twice published revisions of its 1936 
‘principles’ statement, in 1941 and 1948 
(‘Accounting principles’, 194 1 ; ‘Accounting con- 
cepts and standards’, 1948). Both reaffirmed the 
‘cost principle’. As in 1936, they were critical of 
revaluations, and they said that the country’s expe- 
rience with changing price levels did not warrant 
making adjustments for such changes. Again, as in 
1936, they relegated values other than historical 
cost to supplementary disclosures. In its 1941 
Annual Report, the SEC applauded the 1941 revi- 
sion (SEC, 1942:198; see also Werntz, 1941:315). 
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In its 1948 Annual Report, the SEC mentioned the 
1948 revision in a favourable light (SEC, 
1949: 1 12). 
For its part, the SEC took a step in 1950 towards 
making permanent its requirement that historical 
cost be used in registrants’ financial statements. It 
announced a general revision of its Regulation 
S-X, which governs the contents of financial re- 
ports filed with the commission and until then had 
dealt chiefly with matters of disclosure and dis- 
play. The proposed revision incorporated a number 
of substantive accounting policy positions that had 
been dealt with during the 1940s in Accounting 
Series Releases. These included a new provision 
that said, ‘Except as otherwise specifically provid- 
ed, accounting for all assets shall be based on cost’ 
(‘Security [sic] and Exchange Commission’, 
1950:160). The effect of this new provision would 
change an ad hoc position of the Commission on 
the use of historical cost to one that was set in 
stone. So strong was the negative reaction within 
the accountancy profession to many of the SEC’s 
proposed changes in Regulation S - X ,  which 
included a rare expression of opposition from the 
assembled members at an annual meeting of 
the American Accounting Association (Zeff, 
1966:64-5), that the SEC in 1951 withdrew the 
provisions dealing with accounting principles in 
the proposed revision of Regulation S-X in return 
for an assurance that the Committee on 
Accounting Procedure would, among other things, 
codify its series of BulZetins (Zeff, 1972: 158-9)! 
Yet the SEC achieved its objective by another 
means: the revised Regulation S-X included a pro- 
vision that in effect incorporated the Accounting 
Series Releases in the regulation (see Barr, 
19795 1). 
In 1953, the committee issued Accounting 
Research Bulletin No. 43, which was a restatement 
and revision of the committee’s previous Bulletins 
dealing with accounting principles and procedure. 
This was the codification sought by the SEC. 
Chapter 9A of the Bulletin was a reaffirmation of 
ARB No. 33, but six of the 20 committee members 
dissented, which was one vote short of defeating 
the reaffirmation. The dissenters included senior 
partners of Peat Marwick and Price Waterhouse, 
three well-known partners of middle-sized firms, 
and an academic. The committee felt obliged to 
state in Ch. 9B of ARB No. 43 that, in cases where 
upward revaluations in depreciable assets had 
been recorded, the subsequent depreciation should 
be computed on the written-up amounts. 
In the late 1940s and into the 1950s, there was 
disagreement within and among the largest ac- 
countancy firms on the propriety of using replace- 
ment cost depreciation. Evidently, Peat Marwick 
was opposed, but senior partners in Price 
Waterhouse and Arthur Andersen were at odds 
King wrote, ‘[Assistant Chief Accountant Andrew] Barr 
and I were present at the meeting at which this release was de- 
cided upon and it was strongly advocated by us’. Letter from 
Earle C. King to The Commission, dated 22 October 1947 (in 
the author’s files). 
l o  Prominent among those who criticised ARB No. 33 during 
the annual meeting was George 0. May, who had been private- 
ly counselling U.S. Steel on the wording of the disclosures 
relating to its replacement cost depreciation charge, with 
which he agreed. Another critic, who spoke on the floor of the 
annual meeting, was William Blackie, a CPA, who was vice 
president of Caterpillar Tractor Co. See Blackie (1948). 
Interview with Carman Blough, January 1967. See also 
Papworth (1948:3834). 
” Chief Accountant King had earlier recommended that the 
Committee on Accounting Procedure publish a comprehensive 








































54 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
1956:159-60). Yet in 1958, by which time 
Armstrong was no longer on the Commission, the 
SEC’s accounting staff signified to the committee 
that there was no need for such a general state- 
ment. Thereupon, the committee removed the proj- 
ect from its agenda.I3 
2.2. General price-level accounting 
Since the late 194Os, interest had been growing 
in the use of general price-level adjustments ap- 
plied to historical cost, rather than the use of cur- 
rent cost, to reflect the impact of the increase in 
prices on financial ~tatements.’~ Perhaps a reason 
for this different tack, in the minds of some, was 
the hope that the SEC might view it as less open to 
objection than the use of current cost. In 1952, the 
report of the Study Group on Business Income, 
which was engineered by George 0. May, recom- 
mended that ‘corporations whose ownership is 
widely distributed should be encouraged to furnish 
[supplementary] information that will facilitate the 
determination of income measured in units of ap- 
proximately equal purchasing power’, subject to 
audit where practicable ( 1952:105).15 SEC chief 
accountant King, who was a member of the broad- 
ly constituted Study Group, strongly dissented 
from this recommendation (1952: 122-3). The 
Study Group’s report provided encouragement for 
the emerging interest, stimulated by the earlier 
writings of Henry W. Sweeney (1936) and William 
Paton (1941), in general price-level (GPL)-restat- 
ed financial information to deal with the recent 
run-up of inflation. 
Beginning in 1953/54, under the aggressive 
leadership of Leonard Spacek, Arthur Andersen & 
Co., which had a large client base in the public 
utility industry, was an outspoken advocate of cur- 
rent cost accounting or, alternatively, the use of 
GPL indices to restate historical cost deprecia- 
tion.I6 Indeed, in March 1954 the firm boldly peti- 
tioned the SEC to require companies to state in an 
audited footnote the amount by which net income 
failed to reflect GPL-restated depreciation of plant 
and p r~pe r ty . ’~  In May 1954, the SEC denied the 
firm’s petition, saying as follows: 
‘The Commission has concluded that [the firm’s 
proposal] is not in accordance with sound and 
generally accepted accounting principles, that it 
does not have substantial authoritative support, 
and that its adoption is not necessary or appro- 
priate in the public interest or for the protection 
of investors or consumers to carry out the provi- 
sions of the statutes administered by the 
Commission.’18 
A more categorical denial could hardly be imag- 
ined. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, Spacek’s activism led 
his firm to support the efforts of several of its pub- 
within their respective firms on the contentious 
subject.‘* 
From 1954 to 1958, consecutive subcommittees 
of the Committee on Accounting Procedure 
laboured to develop a Bulletin that would allow the 
upward revaluation of assets, using the analogy of 
a quasi-reorganisation. Curiously, these efforts had 
been encouraged by a suggestion from SEC 
chairman J. Sinclair Armstrong that it would be 
helpful to have an authoritative statement of the 
circumstances in which upward departures from 
historical cost might be justified (see Armstrong, 
’* Two successive senior technical partners at Peat Marwick, 
Samuel Broad and John Peoples, dissented from the 
Committee on Accounting Procedure’s letter reaffirming ARE 
No. 33 and Chapter 9A in ARE No. 43, respectively. In Price, 
Waterhouse (PW), John B. Inglis, who gave US Steel a quali- 
fied report in 1947 because of its use of replacement cost de- 
preciation, voted in favour, but the redoubtable George 0. May, 
by then retired but very much an active thinker and writer, and 
his prot6gC in the firm, Paul Grady, together with several other 
senior PW partners were opposed. In Arthur Andersen, Paul K. 
Knight, a partner in the firm’s New York office and a member 
of the committee, was in favour, while Leonard Spacek and the 
partners in the Chicago home office were opposed. The aca- 
demic who opposed Chapter 9A was C. Aubrey Smith, of the 
University of Texas, who had spent the summer of 1935 in the 
SEC’s registration division. From outward appearances, the 
leading partners in Ernst & Ernst, Haskins & Sells, and 
Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery were in favour of the po- 
sition adopted in ARE No. 33 and in Chapter 9A of ARE No. 43. 
I 3  Report of the Committee on Accounting Procedure, dated 
30 September 1958 (in the author’s files). As it happened, the 
Committee chairman at that time was former SEC Chief 
Accountant Werntz, by then a partner in a major accountancy 
firm. 
l 4  An early indication of this interest was the publication in 
April 1949 by the AIA’s Research Department of a memoran- 
dum entitled ‘An inquiry into the reliability of index num- 
bers’, which was originally intended ‘for use as background 
material for consideration by the committee on accounting 
procedure in its deliberations as to the feasibility of using 
index numbers for adjustment of depreciation and/or property 
carrying values’ (Research Department, 1949:312 ftn 1). 
l5 The Study Group was sponsored by the Institute and was 
financed jointly by it and the Rockefeller Foundation. It was 
composed of businessmen, lawyers, economists, statisticians, 
and others, as well as accountants. 
l 6  In the UK, GPL accounting became known as Current 
Purchasing Power (CPP) accounting. GPL accounting was not 
regarded by theorists as a departure from historical cost ac- 
counting but instead as an adaptation of historical cost ac- 
counting to inflationary conditions. 
l 7  The petition was transmitted in a letter to the Commission 
on 24 March 1954 and was signed by Leonard Spacek on be- 
half of the firm. Curiously, the SEC, when reporting on the pe- 
tition in its next Annud Report, erroneously referred to the 
petition as calling for ‘economic depreciation (based on re- 
placement at current prices)’ (SEC, 1955: 107). Perhaps Chief 
Accountant King did not fully appreciate the difference be- 
tween GPL-restatements and replacement cost adjustments. 
I t (  Letter from Orval L. DuBois, Secretary, Securities and 
Exchange Commission, to Leonard Spacek. dated 28 May 
1954. The firm’s petition, as well as the letter from DuBois, is 
in the author’s files. The term ‘substantial authoritative sup- 
port’ has been used by the SEC since 1938 as the criterion for 
sound accounting practice. See the SEC’s Accounting Series 
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lic utility clients to record GPL-restated deprecia- 
tion or current cost-adjusted depreciation in their 
financial statements, one client also doing a GPL- 
restatement of its fixed assets in the balance sheet 
(see Randall, 1974; Staff of the Accounting 
Research Division, 1963:194-9, 21 1-17). The 
companies’ motivation was to show a reduced net 
income in the light of a larger investment base fol- 
lowing the postwar inflation, so that this lower rate 
of return on assets would support their argument to 
regulators for higher energy rates to consumers. 
Yet those of its clients that were SEC registrants 
were required to relocate the depreciation charge 
‘below the line’ in their filings with the 
Commission (Zeff, 1992:457-9; Goodrich, 1969). 
The SEC insisted that a company’s reported earn- 
ings must reflect depreciation based on conven- 
tional historical cost. 
Apart from its work with audit clients, Andersen 
issued a series of publications from 1959 onwards 
in which it advocated one or another form of price- 
level depreciation, price-level accounting, and 
eventually ‘value accounting’ (Memorandum on 
Price-Level Depreciation, 1959; Accounting and 
Reporting Problems of the Accounting Profession, 
19695-1 6; Objectives of Financial Statements, 
1972). 
Also during the 1950s, the American Accounting 
Association, the organisation of accounting aca- 
demics, took up the cause of GPL-restated finan- 
cial reporting. In 195 1 ,  an Association committee, 
which included a leading practitioner (Maurice H. 
Stans, of Alexander Grant & Company), recom- 
mended that companies include comprehensive 
GPL-restated financial statements as supplemen- 
tary information to their primary statements 
(‘Price level changes and financial statements’, 
195 1 ). In 1955-56, the Association published 
three monographs that explained and illustrated 
GPL-restated financial statements and argued their 
merits (Mason, 1955; Jones, 1955; Jones, 1956). 
In 1957, the Association committee charged with 
revising its ‘principles’ statements turned a corner, 
departing from the Association’s three previous 
‘principles’ statements on whether to provide 
GPL-restated information. The committee, chaired 
by Robert K. Mautz of the University of Illinois, 
recommended that investors should be furnished 
with supplementary data ‘to reflect the effect of 
price changes in the specific assets held by the en- 
terprise during the period, to show the effect upon 
the enterprise of movements in the general price 
level, or to achieve both purposes’ (Committee on 
55 
Iy Sidney Davidson, who was a member of the APB at that 
time. has confirmed this reason for the change from an 
Opinion to a Statement. Telephone conversation with 
Davidson on 3 1 December 2006. 
lo Accounting Principles Board, Minutes of meeting - 
16-18 August 1967, p.10 (in the author’s files). 
Accounting Concepts and Standards, 1957544). 
After having indicated its positive view on the 
Association’s three previous ‘principles’ state- 
ment, the SEC was conspicuously silent in its 
Annual Reports about whether it endorsed the 
Association’s most recent statement. Chief 
accountant Barr would write in 1959, begrudging- 
ly, that the SEC ‘probably would not object to the 
inclusion of such [GPL-restated] statements as 
supplementary material in a filing with the 
Commission’ (Barr and Koch, 1959: 182). 
During the 1 9 6 0 ~ ~  the Accounting Principles 
Board (APB), which had succeeded the 
Committee on Accounting Procedure in 1959, be- 
came interested in GPL-restatements. In 1963, the 
APB sponsored the publication of a research study 
that explained and illustrated GPL-restated finan- 
cial statements (Staff of the Accounting Research 
Division, 1963). In an APB research study pub- 
lished in 1965 and written by Paul Grady, a senior 
partner in Price Waterhouse, he carried forward the 
views of his late mentor, George 0. May, by advo- 
cating a supplementary reporting of the financial 
effects of price-level changes (1965:370). 
By the end of the 1960s, the APB added tem- 
pered support for GPL-restated financial state- 
ments as supplements to the primary statements. In 
1969, the APB unanimously approved a non-bind- 
ing Statement to call for the supplementary disclo- 
sure of GPL-restated statements. Initially, the 
subcommittee that began in 1966 to draft the pro- 
nouncement understood that the board intended to 
issue it as a mandatory Opinion. Miller and 
Redding report that the pronouncement became a 
Statement when the board found that it was unable 
to secure a two-thirds majority for GPL-restate- 
ments as a required practice (1986:91).19 Had the 
APB issued an Opinion, the SEC would not have 
enforced compliance with it. Indeed, at the board’s 
August 1967 meeting, LeRoy Layton, the chair- 
man of the subcommittee, informed the board that 
SEC chief accountant Andrew Barr ‘was generally 
not in favour of the positions taken in the draft 
Opinion principally because of the problems asso- 
ciated with (a) parallel statement presentation, (b) 
continued restatement of previous financial state- 
ments as general price indices change, which he 
believes would be baffling to readers and might be 
used as an excuse for ‘appraisal accounting’ by 
some persons, and (c) possible legal implica- 
tions’.20 In the event, few companies adopted the 
APB’s recommendation. 
As noted earlier, the periodic intervention of the 
SEC chief accountant on certain drafts of the 
Committee on Accounting Procedure and the APB, 
which occurred also on issues other than the ones 
that are germane to this article, raises a question 
whether committee and APB members were vot- 









































evitable, namely, the position espoused, or known 
to be held, by the chief accountant.2’ 
2.3. Further on upward departures from 
historical cost 
Those who might have hoped at the outset of the 
1960s that the newly formed APB could open the 
door, if only slightly, to upward departures from 
historical cost accounting were rudely taken aback 
by the APB’s peremptory rejection of its research 
study on accounting principles, today known as a 
conceptual framework document, which was pub- 
lished in 1962. The two academic authors of the 
study, Robert T. Sprouse and Maurice Moonitz, 
advocated the use of net realisable values or, alter- 
natively, current replacement cost to measure mer- 
chandise inventory and the use of current 
replacement cost to measure plant and equipment 
(1962:27-34). The research study was received 
coolly, to say the least, by the members of the APB 
and by the advisory committee on the project. 
Indeed, three members of the advisory committee, 
former SEC chief accountants Blough and Werntz 
and the sitting chief accountant, Barr, totally re- 
jected the authors’ recommendations.22 Barr 
minced no words when he wrote, ‘indiscriminate 
application of the [recommended] principles could 
result in false and misleading financial statements 
and might tend to undermine the confidence of the 
public in all published financial statements’ 
(Sprouse and Moonitz, 1962:60). For its part, the 
APB discarded the research study and declined to 
consider it again (‘Statement’, 1962). 
In 1963, Arthur R. Wyatt wrote an accounting re- 
search study on business combinations for the 
APB in which, among other things, he recom- 
mended a ‘fair-value pooling’ concept. This meant 
that, for business combinations effected by an 
issue of shares and where the constituents were of 
approximately equal size, the assets of both con- 
stituents should be restated at their fair values, up 
or down (1963:107). He insisted that this approach 
was ‘applicable only when the facts of the transac- 
tion indicate clearly that the resultant entity is, 
in effect, a new enterprise’ (107). Yet chief 
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accountant Barr likened Wyatt’s ‘fair-value pool- 
ing’ concept for business combinations to the up- 
ward quasi-reorganisations to which the SEC had 
objected some years ago (1965:24). Barr was ever 
on guard for what he regarded as ‘upward’ quasi- 
reorganisations in new guise. 
In APB Opinion No. 6 ,  issued in 1965, whose 
purpose was to declare the status of the previously 
issued Accounting Research Bulletins from No. 43 
onwards, it was stated that, with respect to Chs. 9A 
and 9B of ARB No. 43, ‘property, plant and equip- 
ment should not be written up by an entity to re- 
flect appraisal, market or current values which are 
above cost to the entity’ but that ‘Whenever appre- 
ciation has been recorded on the books, income 
should be charged with depreciation computed on 
the written up amounts’ (APB, 1965:42). One of 
the APB members, Sidney Davidson, of the 
University of Chicago and a former student of 
Paton’s, qualified his assent to the board’s view 
that fixed assets should not be written up to reflect 
current costs ‘but only because he feels current 
measurement techniques are inadequate for such 
restatement. When adequate measurement meth- 
ods are developed, he believes that both the re- 
porting of operations in the income statement and 
the valuation of plant in the balance sheet would 
be improved through the use of current rather than 
acquisition costs’ (42). 
In 1966, an American Accounting Association 
committee produced A Statement of Basic 
Accounting Theory (Committee to Prepare a 
Statement of Basic Accounting Theory, 1966). 
Among other things, it recommended that both 
historical and current costs be reported in the body 
of companies’ financial statements (30-1, 
Appendix B). The author recalls a gathering dur- 
ing the Association’s 1966 annual meeting, at 
which the committee presented its recommenda- 
tions. During the meeting, SEC chief accountant 
Barr stated that the SEC would not accept such 
financial statements. 
A possible reason why US companies may not 
have been greatly concerned over the impact on 
earnings of historical cost accounting during times 
of rising prices was the availability of last-in, first- 
out (LIFO) accounting for inventories as well as 
the use by a considerable number of companies of 
one or both of the accelerated methods of depreci- 
ation for financial reporting purposes following 
enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 
In 1972, Charles T. Horngren, an academic and a member 
of the APB, argued: ‘The SEC (top management) has used de- 
centralisation with a master’s touch. Its lower-level manage- 
ment (APB) does an enormous amount of work for no salary 
and has just enough freedom to want to continue the arrange- 
ment.. . .the board has been unjustifiably criticised for timidity 
or vacillation on several occasions when the basic explanation 
for the Board’s behavior has been no assurance of support 
from the SEC’ (1972:39). 
22 Blough was then a member of the APB. and Werntz, a 
partner in the firm of Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery, had 
been the last chairman of the Committee on Accounting 
Procedure. Barr had been expressly authorised by the 
Commission to accept the invitation to serve on the advisory 
committee, which was an unprecedented instance of a chief 
accountant serving on an Institute committee. 
3. Coping with the inflation of the 1970s - 
the SEC recants on current costhahe 
A major changing of the guard within the SEC oc- 
curred in 1972. Andrew Barr, the last of the chief 
accountants who had joined the SEC’s accounting 
staff in the 1930s, retired. Instead of tapping A. 
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tended to succeed him, SEC chairman William J.  
Casey decided that he wanted to look outside the 
Commission for the next chief ac~ountant.2~ He 
chose an activist, John C. (Sandy) Burton, an ac- 
counting and finance professor at Columbia 
University who had studied accounting at 
Haverford College with Philip W. Bell. It was Bell, 
together with Edgar 0. Edwards, who wrote a 
highly influential book in 1961, The Theory and 
the Measurement of Business Income, in which 
they explained and advocated the use of current 
cost accounting. Burton was already on record as 
favouring a change in the traditional accounting 
model that would better depict economic reality 
(197 150).  Burton, at age 39, had not been an ac- 
countant during the 1930s and thus would not have 
been haunted, like his predecessors, by tales of the 
write-ups during the 1920s. 
US inflation was high throughout the 1970s, and 
one of the earliest exposure drafts issued by the 
newly established Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB), which succeeded the APB in July 
1973, was entitled ‘Financial reporting in units of 
general purchasing power’ (1974). Prior to the 
issue of the exposure draft, the FASB had pub- 
lished a discussion memorandum and held a pub- 
lic hearing on the subject. The recommendation in 
the draft was that companies’ conventional finan- 
cial statements should include a comprehensive 
GPL-restatement of their statements. Almost im- 
mediately, SEC chief accountant Burton derided 
the FASB’s ‘Units of general purchasing power’ 
proposal as ‘PuPU accounting’ (1975:70). He ar- 
gued that GPL-restated financial statements would 
not provide investors with any better information 
than conventional statements. He observed that 
‘the impact of inflation falls with dramatic un- 
evenness on various sectors of the economy and 
various parts of firms’. He added, ‘It is essential 
that rapid movement take place in the direction of 
replacement cost accounting so that investors can 
perceive the effects of inflation on the activities of 
business enterprise’ (70). Coming from the SEC, 
this was indeed a revolutionary call for reform. 
Burton meant what he said. In August 1975, the 
SEC announced a proposed revision to Regulation 
S-X to require that a defined set of large companies 
make footnote disclosure of replacement cost in- 
formation for cost of sales, inventories, deprecia- 
tion, and productive capacity (SEC, 1975; ‘SEC 
proposes’, 1975). The proposal, affecting about 
1,000 of the country’s largest non-financial corpo- 
rations, went into effect in March 1976, when the 
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23 Interview with A. Clarence Sampson, conducted by 
Ernest Ten Eyck, 7 July 2005 (SEC Historical Society, at 
http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/oralhistories/index .php 
#sampson). 
SEC issued Accounting Series Release (ASR) No. 
190, thereby rebuffing the FASB, which had opted 
for GPL-restatements (SEC, 1976; ‘SEC adopts’, 
1976). The SEC stated in the release that ‘it did not 
and does not view its [ 19751 proposal as competi- 
tive with that of the FASB’, because companies 
could adopt GPL-restatements in conjunction with 
historical costs or replacement costs. But Leonard 
M. Savoie, a former AICPA executive vice-presi- 
dent, wrote, ‘I do not know of anyone who agrees 
with the Commission on that, and the FASB de- 
ferred action on its exposure draft’ (1979:231). 
The SEC clearly had taken the initiative for deal- 
ing with the effects of inflation out of the FASB’s 
hands. 
Although the required replacement cost informa- 
tion was not to be reflected in the body of the fi- 
nancial statements and did not have to be subject 
to audit, this was nonetheless a historic deviation 
from the SEC’s defence of the primacy of histori- 
cal cost accounting. Charles Horngren, a close stu- 
dent of the US accounting standard-setting 
process, attested to the pivotal role played by the 
chief accountant: 
‘As chief accountant, John C. Burton persuaded 
the SEC to mandate fair values.. . .strong influen- 
tial leaders can make a difference, especially if 
they are at points of leverage in the process. And 
timing counts too. For example, as chief ac- 
countant of the SEC, Andrew Barr had a well- 
known aversion to upward departures from 
historical costs. If Barr were sitting in Burton’s 
chair in 1976, I wonder if the replacement cost 
requirements would have been issued.’ 
(Horngren, 1986: 38) 
Under Burton’s leadership, the SEC performed a 
role in the US similar to that played by the 
Sandilands Committee in the UK in 1975, when 
the latter suddenly refocused the field of debate 
from Current Purchasing Power accounting, which 
had been recommended by the Accounting 
Standards Steering Committee in a provisional 
standard, to current cost accounting (see Tweedie 
and Whittington, 1984, ch. 5) .  
In 1979, the FASB recovered its lost ground. It 
issued Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards (SFAS) No. 33 (1979b), which called for 
the supplementary disclosure of both current cost 
and GPL-restated data, dubbing the latter as ‘con- 
stant dollar accounting’, which, like the SEC re- 
lease, applied only to very large corporations. 
Accordingly, in October 1979, the SEC issued 
Accounting Series Release No. 271 to delete the 
disclosure requirements set out in ASR No. 190 
once the FASB’s SFAS No. 33 were to take effect. 
Although an FASB standard now governed prac- 










































Later in the 1970s, the SEC took a further step 
away from its long embrace of historical cost ac- 
counting by calling for the required use of current 
value information for proven reserves in the body 
of the financial statements of oil and gas produc- 
e r ~ ? ~  The issue arose in the aftermath of the Arab 
Oil Embargo of the United States and other 
Western nations in 1973. Congress enacted the 
Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) of 
1975, which directed the SEC, after receiving for- 
mal advice from the FASB, to eliminate the diver- 
sity of accounting practice used in oil and gas 
production. Until then, some producers would cap- 
italise only the costs incurred in successful pro- 
duction, while expensing the costs associated with 
failed attempts at discovering oil or gas deposits. 
This method, used mainly by the large, vertically 
integrated oil and gas companies, is known as 
‘successful efforts costing’. Other producers 
would capitalise all of the costs associated with oil 
and gas exploration. This method, used mainly by 
the smaller companies, is known as ‘full costing’. 
In 1977, the FASB issued SFAS No. 19, which, 
by a 4-3 vote, recommended that only the ‘suc- 
cessful efforts costing’ method be permitted. In 
reaching its conclusion, the board was under con- 
siderable pressure from small and medium-sized 
oil and gas companies not to require the use of 
‘successful efforts costing’ (Staubus, 2003: 185-6; 
Van Riper, 1994, ch.4). As required by the EPCA, 
the SEC held public hearings, covering 12 days 
and accumulating 2,700 pages of transcript, with 
all five members of the Commission in attendance. 
Furthermore, there was intense pressure brought 
on the SEC from the smaller oil and gas compa- 
nies, much of which was transmitted through 
members of Congress and federal departments, 
such as Justice and Energy. They used all of their 
lobbying might to defend against the imposition of 
‘successful efforts costing’, which, they believed, 
would make their earnings trend much more 
volatile. For one of the few times in the SEC’s his- 
tory, all of the commissioners - who rarely are 
versed in accounting - personally became im- 
mersed in an accounting issue.25 Not being 
schooled in accounting, the commissioners had no 
allegiance to historical cost accounting, and they 
believed that, for the oil and gas industry, it was 
market values, not historical costs, that were rele- 
vant to investors. Indeed, this view was pressed on 
them numerous times during the hearings. It 
helped that the chairman, Harold M. Williams, al- 
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though trained as a lawyer, had been formerly a 
business school dean and a board director of a 
major oil and gas company. The commissioners 
also believed, as did their accounting staff, that 
neither ‘successful efforts costing’ nor ‘full cost- 
ing’ was demonstrably superior to the other. 
Accordingly, in August 1978, the SEC issued 
Accounting Series Release No. 253, which said 
that steps should be taken to develop and imple- 
ment ‘reserve recognition accounting’ (RRA), a 
variant of current value accounting, for required 
use in the body of oil and gas companies’ financial 
statements. Under RRA, the unrealised holding 
gains and losses in value of proven oil and gas re- 
serves were to be taken to earnings. For the first 
time since the founding of the SEC in 1934, the 
Commission required a class of registrants to de- 
part from historical cost accounting in the body of 
their financial statements. Times had indeed 
changed, and by then the memories of the flagrant 
write-ups of the 1920s had faded. 
The SEC said that, in the interim, until RRA is 
ready for implementation, oil and gas companies 
may continue using either ‘successful efforts cost- 
ing’ or ‘full costing’. Thereupon, the FASB felt it 
had no option but to issue SFAS No. 25 to suspend 
the effective date for the requirement in SFAS 
No. 19 to use ‘successful efforts costing’ (1979a). 
Following the issue of the SEC’s release, the 
major oil and gas companies began to bring pres- 
sure on the SEC not to require the use of current 
values for their proven oil and gas reserves be- 
cause of its impact on the public’s perception of 
their profitability at a time of steadily rising petrol 
prices and constricted supply. The Organisation of 
the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was 
raising the price of crude each quarter, and the 
major refining and marketing companies were al- 
ready being denounced in the media for their esca- 
lating profits. In the end, in February 1981, the 
SEC reconsidered its requirement that RRA be 
used in the body of producers’ financial statements 
and instead announced its support of a move by the 
FASB to develop a comprehensive footnote dis- 
closure that would reflect the principles implicit 
in RRA. The FASB issued that guidance in SFAS 
No. 69, issued in November 1982. 
But the precedent had been set. In 1978, for the 
first time, the SEC had announced as a matter of 
policy that historical cost accounting was not al- 
ways to be preferred over the use of current values 
in the body of companies’ financial statements. 
24 For a full and authoritative treatment of this oil and gas 
accounting episode, see Gorton (1991). 
25 An earlier such hearing was on 22 November 1965, when 
the Commissioners met with a delegation from the APB to dis- 
cuss the classification of the deferred tax credit, which led to 
the issue of Accounting Series Release No.  102 (SEC, 1965). 
For a discussion of this episode, see Zeff (2007). 
4. Conclusion 
One can see from the foregoing analysis that 
the SEC established and restated its position 
time and again on the primacy of conventional his- 
torical cost accounting during its first 38 years 
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on Accounting Procedure or the Accounting 
Principles Board was disposed to approve upward 
adjustments in one manner or another from con- 
ventional historical cost. This posture of the SEC 
explains the deeply held attachment to historical 
cost accounting that one associates with US finan- 
cial reporting during much of the 20th century. 
The year 1972 marked the arrival of a chief 
accountant who was unencumbered by memories 
of the indiscriminate write-ups of the 1920s and, 
moreover, had been tutored in the merits of current 
cost accounting. Owing to his proactive influence, 
the SEC approved the required use by more than 
one thousand large companies of supplementary 
replacement cost disclosures during the inflation- 
ary 1970s. The SEC took one major step further 
59 
when, during an intense period of controversy over 
accounting for oil and gas exploration in the sec- 
ond half of the 1970s, it called for the integration 
of current values into the body of companies’ fi- 
nancial statements as a better solution than arbi- 
trating the supremacy of ‘full cost costing’ in 
relation to ‘successful efforts costing’. In the 
1970s, the SEC had entered a new era in the regu- 
lation of company financial reporting. 
The record of the SEC’s numerous and powerful 
intrusions into the process of establishing proper 
accounting practice for inventories and fixed as- 
sets does much to call into question whether the 
United States truly has had a private-sector process 
for establishing ‘generally accepted accounting 
principles’. 
Appendix 
The role of the SEC chief accountant in relation to the bodies that establish accounting principles 
The chief accountant is the principal adviser to the Commission on accounting and auditing matters. From 1937 
to 1982, the Commission issued Accounting Series Releases to express its view on accounting and auditing 
matters and to report on enforcement actions taken by the Commission. The Office of the Chief Accountant, 
together with the Division of Corporation Finance, which oversees corporate disclosure of important informa- 
tion to the investing public, have, since 1975, issued Staff Accounting Bulletins to convey their interpretations 
and practices in administering the disclosure requirements of the federal securities acts. 
While the SEC has stated that it looks to the private sector for leadership in the establishment of accounting 
principles, all parties know that the ultimate authority to establish those principles rests with the SEC, which, 
in most instances, usually means the Office of the Chief Accountant. 
The American Institute of Accountants, at the urging of the chief accountant (Blough, 1967: 5-7), enlarged its 
Committee on Accounting Procedure in 1938-39 and invested it with authority to issue Accounting Research 
Bulletins (ARBS), setting out its opinion on proper accounting practice, which came to be known as ‘generally 
accepted accounting principles’ (GAAP). Unless the chief accountant were to make known his disagreement 
with an ARB or with the authoritative pronouncements of its successor bodies, it may be assumed that the SEC 
expects all publicly traded companies, known as registrants, to comply with them. As is made evident in this 
article, the chief accountant occasionally attended meetings of the committee, and he and his staff communi- 
cated on a regular basis, in writing and orally, with members of the committee and its research staff. 
The Accounting Principles Board (APB), which succeeded the Committee on Accounting Procedure in 1959, 
was a senior technical committee of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, which adopted its 
new name in 1957. Its authoritative recommendations on GAAP were called Opinions. In addition, it issued 
several Statements that constituted non-binding advice. The SEC chief accountant and his staff maintained 
frequent contact with the APB and its staff but did not attend its meetings. 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), an independent standard-setting body overseen by a board 
of trustees, succeeded the APB in 1973. Its authoritative recommendations on GAAP are known as Statements 
of Financial Accounting Standards. As with the FASB’s two predecessors, the SEC chief accountant and his 
staff have been in regular contact with the FASB and its staff. Some or all of the SEC commissioners meet pe- 
riodically with some or all of the FASB members, together with their respective staffs, and the chief account- 
ant participates in meetings of the FASB’s Emerging Issues Task Force and attends and speaks at the quarterly 
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